lulling flow-such episodes could arise again. Santayana's call for vigilance makes sense only when memory evaluates the past rather than merely recalling it. A vigilant memory is a judging memory.
Lawyers and policymakers, moreover, have different roles from historians, and cannot afford to suspend judgment as historians do. 15 The Americans. She must come to a judgment about whether that policy was right or wrong, justified or blameworthy in its time. She must not merely remember; she must evaluate.
Because lawyers and policymakers are human beings, this task of judging the past is difficult. Powerful emotions pull simultaneously in opposite directions. On the one hand, people wish to affirm the timelessness of core moral principles, and to own up to the mistakes of the past so that they will not recur. On the other hand, people naturally feel loyal to their forebears and want to honor them and respect the integrity of their historical moment. Under the pressure of these rival emotions, public discourse about the acts of earlier generations often becomes a pendulum that swings from shrill denunciations 16 to credulous justifications.
More commonly, judges consider mitigating evidence of a defendant's cultural framework in deciding whether the defendant deserves a modest break at sentencing. 22 In the main, however, claims of cultural excuse have made little headway in the criminal law.
This Essay will argue that the criminal law's treatment of culture can help us think in a principled way about the wrongdoing of prior generations. There is an important similarity between culture and time: In much the same way that we might consider excusing a person because of where he is from, we might also consider excusing a person because of when he is from. But, as with the cultural defense, this notion of "temporal" defense will not reach far. Just as the cultural defense should not fully exculpate those whose culture does not entirely negate their mens rea, the temporal defense should not fully exculpate those who acted with a culpable mental state in their historical moment.
While it is admittedly odd to think of historical actors having (or not having) mens rea, the Essay will identify several factors relating to the chosenness of the actor's conduct that can help us distinguish past acts that should be wholly or partly excused from those that should not. The inquiry will focus on the political and social climate and the moral norms and behavioral expectations of the actor's day. a choice, an act of independent moral agency, rather than as an inevitability? 23 Only to the extent that we see it as inevitable should we think about excusing it.
To say that an act from an earlier time should not be entirely excused is not, of course, to say that it should be entirely condemned. Here, too, the criminal law provides a useful model. At a criminal sentencing hearing, the sentencer's mission is to develop as full a picture as possible of the offender and the offense, in order to craft a punishment that takes into account not just the offense but the larger circumstances in which it occurred, some of which may be extenuating. 24 Even where the criminal law does not exculpate an accused on the basis of evidence of his cultural practices, the law often allows such evidence in mitigation at sentencing. Much the same should also be true of our consideration of the wrongdoing of prior generations. Although evidence of "what the world was like back then" will rarely absolve a person of all responsibility for what he chose to do and for the harm he chose to inflict, such evidence should assist us in drawing a more complete and balanced picture of past generations as full, complex human beings who were more than just the sum of certain of their actions.
We might prefer not to see our ancestors in this light. It is certainly less challenging-to our image of ourselves and to our narrative about our country-to see them as justified actors whose blemishes we can cover up with the cosmetic of context.
But this is risky. In justifying the acts of our ancestors, we not only dishonor the memory 9 of those they oppressed. We also create the circumstances for renewed oppression of the powerless of today and tomorrow.
2. The Cultural Defense and the "Temporal Defense"
The central insight of this Essay is that the criminal law's rules for assessing the wrongdoing of people from foreign cultures can help us think more clearly about how to assess the wrongdoing of prior generations. Everything hinges on the analogy between these two seemingly different judgments. It is therefore sensible to begin by drawing the analogy clearly, and carefully considering the objections to it.
Consider the following story: John and his lover Sara are from a different culture from our own. John learns that Sara has had sex with another man. In John and Sara's culture, a woman's sexual infidelity is a grave insult to a man's honor. of those who went before us. Let us therefore examine the culture defense and the progress the criminal law has made toward solving those problems.
The Risks and Benefits of Cultural and Temporal Excuse
The cultural defense in the criminal law is the subject of a fairly rich literature, most of it less than twenty years old. 31 That literature is, perhaps not surprisingly, marked by disagreement. Something approaching agreement has emerged, however, on a couple of points. First, most scholars now agree that a new, full-blown defense to criminal liability grounded in cultural difference is a bad idea. And second, most scholars now agree that evidence of cultural practices ought to be admitted, on a case-bycase basis, to support certain existing criminal law defenses.
The boundaries of the debate over the criminal law's cultural defense were marked in two law review pieces published in 1986. One, a student note published in the Harvard Law Review, presented an unabashed plea for the recognition of a formal "cultural defense" that would completely exonerate people who, through their cultural practices, commit criminal acts. 32 The note's author contended that a defense based in cultural difference is a necessary and sensible way of honoring the nation's commitments to cultural pluralism and to individualized justice. 33 "A new immigrant," the author explained, "has not been given the same opportunity [as a long-term resident] to absorbthrough exposure to important socializing institutions-the norms underlying this nation's criminal laws." 34 The author conceded that a cultural defense might make it harder for the law to articulate a coherent social order and to deter crime, but countered that the effects might well be the opposite if immigrant groups came to recognize that the American legal system was sensitive to their cultural traditions.
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The other 1986 piece, a student comment by Julia P. offer a defense of necessity or duress if she can offer evidence that her culture predicted far greater harm to the children if they were not so marked.
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To be sure, authors have emphasized that it is important for prosecutors to make evidence available to the factfinder that counters or challenges defendants' cultural claims, in order to reduce the risk that factfinders will be tricked into mistaking willfully misogynist or child-abusive conduct for innocent cultural practice. But the weight of scholarly opinion has rejected the claim that all evidence of cultural practice should be completely barred. 50 It has instead settled around the idea that cultural evidence ought to be admissible in order to support established legal defenses based on the defendant's mental state.
These insights from the literature on the cultural defense offer us guidance on the problem of judging the wrongdoing of prior generations. On the one hand, we benefit from the literature's firm recognition that cultural context sometimes ought to temper blame. That recognition reassures us that our concern for the unfairness of judging with the benefit of hindsight stands on something more substantial than a taboo against speaking ill of the dead or a worry about how we will ourselves someday be judged. The criminal law's recognition of the relevance of cultural context also highlights the importance of an actor's mental state at the time he acted. What that mental state might be for historical actors (as opposed to living criminal defendants) remains to be seen. For now it is enough to note that the cultural defense offers support for the excusing instinct that is at the heart of its temporal cousin. Writing in 1782, no less a figure than Thomas Jefferson had noted that "the whole commerce between master and slave is . . . the most unremitting despotism on the one 73 Id. 74 Id. at 16. 75 See BURNARD, supra note 8, at 104-08. 76 See ISAAC, supra note 1, at 46-47, 180-83.
part, and degrading submissions on the other. 77 By 1807, the slave trade had been abolished in England, 78 and a slave revolt had won independence for what would become the Republic of Haiti. 79 In the decades that followed, an abolition movement took root and flourished in the United States. 80 Slavery itself (and not merely the slave trade) was abolished throughout the British empire in 1834. 81 Slave acquisition and ownership in the 1840s were inevitably acts of moral choice in a way that they had not been in an Also relevant to what I am calling the chosenness of past wrongdoing is the position of the questioned practice in the cultural spectrum of its day. We know, for example, that eighteenth-century Jamaican slavery was a brutal institution 82 -more so than the contemporaneous slavery of the southeastern United States. 83 Yet even within that violent framework, we can identify sadistic sociopaths. Thomas Thistlewood did not confine himself to the flogging and sexual harassment that were then common methods of slave control. He devised a punishment he called "Derby's Dose," in which he whipped a misbehaving slave, rubbed "salt pickle, lime juice and bird pepper" in the open wounds, forced another slave to defecate in his mouth, and then gagged him for four or five hours. 84 Thistlewood also forced slaves to urinate into the mouths of others, and sometimes rubbed slaves with molasses and left them naked outside overnight, to be devoured by mosquitoes. 85 Just as the law would insist on knowing whether a particular immigrant's violent behavior was truly an artifact of his culture or a deviant choice of his own, we should ask the same question about the harms that our ancestors inflicted. "Derby's Dose" was an outrage even in its time, and we should not allow arguments about hindsight and context to dull our appreciation of that.
Just as the position of the wrongdoing in the spectrum of an era's conduct is an important facet of the "chosenness" of past wrongdoing, so is the position of the wrongdoer. Not every member of a generation shares equally in the maintenance of its social and cultural practices. Those who seek out or inherit positions of influence and prominence bear special responsibility for those practices because they set an example for others and are in a position to effect change. In this sense, Thomas Thistlewood contrasts usefully with a contemporary of his, Landon Carter. Both men were slaveownersThistlewood in Jamaica and Carter in Virginia. Thistlewood was notably more brutal with his slaves than was Carter. But Thistlewood was also a "nobody" in the society of his day-known not at all outside his small Jamaican parish and even there only for his beautiful garden. 86 His influence-terrorizing as it was-spread no further than the boundaries of his 160-acre farm.
87 84 See id.at 104. 85 See id. 86 See id. at 9. 87 See id. at 10.
opportunity than most men of his day to exert an influence on his society's continued endorsement of the ownership of human beings. With that opportunity came responsibility. It is entirely appropriate for us to weigh his failure to shoulder that responsibility as we assess his participation in the slaveholding culture of his time.
To some it might seem viscerally unfair to condemn centuries-old acts that were not unambiguously immoral in their own time but have become so in ours. The question that this Essay explores, however, is whether this condemnation is any more unfair than the decision our legal system makes to condemn a recent immigrant from a foreign culture for acts that are not unambiguously immoral in his society of origin but are in ours. There is no reason to think that it is.
Indeed, judging a historical event may well be less unfair than judging an immigrant's conduct. A person charged with a crime risks jail time and a monetary fine if he is convicted. His cultural defense is thus grounded in due process concerns; he claims that he should not have to surrender his liberty and property for conduct that was not actually culpable. In other words, the consequences of conviction are severe enough to the defendant that he is in some sense owed consideration of his individuating cultural circumstances. By contrast, when we reflect on the conduct of a person from the past, nothing we say or do can have any impact on his liberty or property. He is gone. If we judge his conduct by the standards of his time rather than ours, we do so not because we actually owe him anything or because he might suffer the physical, emotional, or sentence on grounds of culture. That is, moreover, an opportunity that often ought to succeed, because a person who harms another in a way common to his foreign culture is in fact less culpable than an otherwise similarly situated American who causes the same harm with no cultural support.
Something quite similar obtains when we consider the case of a historical actor who chose to embrace rather than challenge the harmful mores of his day. If we decide that a monolithic morality in his era did not completely prevent him from choosing a different way of acting, we still owe him careful consideration of the circumstances of his time. We must ask how much debate on the moral question his society actually knew, and whether he had access to it. We must ask what the costs to the historical actor of a different choice would have been, and how able he was to pay them. The answers to these questions will, and should, temper our judgment of the choice he actually made.
But they should not lead us to suspend our judgment entirely.
A final example will illustrate the point. Consider a hypothetical Virginia planter who purchased slaves in 1690. We have already seen that slave acquisition in the mid- 108 A difficult, perhaps intractable, problem remains. Must we say that slavery in a historical era in which slaveowners had no access whatsoever to an antislavery discourse was not wrong in its time? Or has the entire human drama been played before a "natural law" backdrop that would condemn some practices as wrong regardless of the context in which they occurred? This question is beyond this Essay's scope. Two observations are, however, in order. First, it is probably false that there has ever been a slaveowner at any time in history who had truly no access whatsoever to an antislavery discourse. Surely there was always such a discourse among his slaves that the slaveowner insulated himself from or chose to ignore.
Second, a very careful inquiry into the true diversity of opinion and argument in a given historical period is essential before any resort to natural law. It is tempting to see an era's prevalent discourse as more monolithic than it actually was. Trevor Burnard, for example, asserts that "until 1750, antislavery sentiment was close to nonexistent." BURNARD, supra note 8, at 105-06. Yet Philippe Rosenberg, a scholar whose work focuses on the precise issue of pre-1750 antislavery discourse, asserts otherwise and identifies a significant number of published critiques of slavery in the British world in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. See Rosenberg, supra note 104, at 640, 626. If Rosenberg is correct, and there never really was a period of institutionalized slavery in the British Atlantic without antislavery argument or agitation, then it may not be necessary to resort entirely to natural law in order to assess the wrongfulness of late-seventeenth-century slaveholding in its time.
This Essay has maintained that the cultural defense and its temporal cousin are more similar to one another than might at first appear. In both instances we wrestle with the problem of judging people's actions according to our standards rather than theirs. In both we risk unfairness and contextual insensitivity by judging harshly. And in both we risk undermining deterrence and endangering the powerless by suspending judgment.
One would expect, therefore, that we would approach the tasks of judging immigrants and of judging ancestors in a similar way. Indeed, one might even expect more rigorous judgment of ancestors than immigrants, because the living, who might go to prison, have a good deal more at stake in our judgment than do the dead. Americans' "loose[ ] confine [ment] " at the site and the "modern waterworks and sewer system," "modern hospital and dental clinic," and "first-rate schooling" that they enjoyed, 112 and says nothing about why they were confined or what their incarceration was really like. 113 Why is it so difficult for us to bring the same sort of judgment to bear on those from an earlier time as on those from a different place? To try to answer this question is, of course, to speculate. But two reasons suggest themselves. French textbook author over a century ago, and that seems no less true today. We therefore have something quite personal at stake when we consider the actions of those who went before us. In freely excusing the wrongs of prior generations, we are not merely honoring the maxim that one should not speak ill of the dead. We are cleaning up an important component of our image of ourselves. As James Loewen suggests, the problem is not that we lack the information that would lead us to think badly of Woodrow equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of man from the infancy of creation to the present day. And where the progress will stop no one can say.
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To admit to serious wrongdoing by earlier generations is to complicate this story of American history as an unbroken upward spiral toward ever greater rectitude and justice. It is to take a narrative of comforting coherence and admit to the contingency, the ambiguity, and at times the incoherence of the actual American experience.
Human beings, both as individuals and in groups, tend to resist contingency, incoherence, and ambiguity in the sense they have of themselves. That is to be expected. What is striking about the cultural defense and its temporal cousin is, however, this: In the cultural context, we bolster our coherence by rejecting the claims of immigrants that they should be judged by their own standards. In the temporal context, we bolster our coherence by indulging such a claim on behalf of our forebears. But what, in the end, is the difference between immigrants and ancestors that would produce such opposite responses? What, for the purposes of our judgment, is the difference between a Laotian immigrant and Franklin Roosevelt? It is quite simply this: Franklin Roosevelt was one of "us," and the Laotian is not. Franklin Roosevelt, and the other forebears of our public and private selves, have a personal claim to our compassion that the newly arrived immigrant from a foreign culture lacks. We have seen that the newly arrived immigrant and the leader of an earlier generation present themselves for our judgment in very similar ways. Surely the fact that we see ourselves more easily in one than the other does not supply a moral basis for judging them differently.
Historian Gordon Craig has written that "[t]he duty of the historian . . . is to restore to the past the options it once had," 121 but it is not just our ancestors who had options. We have them too-important ones-on fronts all around us. Antiterrorism policy. Abortion. Immigration. Health care reform. Global warming and protection of the environment. Physician-assisted suicide. On these and countless other issues-some of which we probably cannot even perceive-our progeny will judge us. They will ask whether the culture of our time was truly monolithic or whether we had access to rival traditions. They will ask whether we injured people out of compulsion or choice. These might be uncomfortable questions for them; they are surely uncomfortable questions for us. But they are the right questions.
